Republic of the
Supreme Court
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SUKHOTHAI CUISINE and RESTAURANT, |
G.R. No. 150437
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Petitioner, |
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|
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Present: |
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- versus - |
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PANGANIBAN, C.J., |
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COURT
OF APPEALS, |
(Chairperson) |
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NATIONAL
LABOR |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, |
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RELATIONS
COMMISSION, |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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PHILIPPINE
LABOR |
CALLEJO, SR., and |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. |
|
(PLAC) Local 460 Sukhothai
Restaurant Chapter, EMMANUEL CAYNO, ALEX MARTINEZ, BILLY BACUS, HERMIE RAZ,
JOSE LANORIAS, LITO ARCE, LINO SALUBRE, CESAR SANGREO, ROLANDO FABREGAS,
JIMMY BALAN, JOVEN LUALHATI, ANTONIO ENEBRAD, JOSE NEIL ARCILLA, REY ARSENAL,
ROEL ESANCHA, EDGAR EUGENIO, ALBERT AGBUYA, ROLANDO PUGONG, ARNEL SALVADOR,
RICKY DEL PRADO, CLAUDIO PANALIGAN, BERNIE DEL MUNDO, JOHN BATHAN, ROBERTO
ECO, JOVEN TALIDONG, LENY LUCENTE, ANALIZA CABLAY, RIGOBERTO TUBAON and MERLY
NAZ, Respondents. |
Promulgated: July 17, 2006 |
x - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari
under Rule 45 questioning the Decision[1]
dated August 8, 2001 promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
63864 which affirmed in toto the Decision dated November 29, 2000 of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC); and the CA Resolution[2]
dated October 18, 2001 which denied the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
This
case originated from a complaint for illegal strike filed with the NLRC by the
petitioner[3]
against private respondents due to an alleged “wildcat strike” and other
concerted action staged in the company premises on June 24, 25 and 26, 1999.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
Sometime in
March 1998, the majority of the employees of the petitioner organized
themselves into a union which affiliated
with the Philippine Labor Alliance
Council (PLAC), and was
designated as PLAC Local 460 Sukhothai Restaurant Chapter (
On
On January 21, 1999, the petitioner
and the Union entered into a Submission Agreement, thereby agreeing to submit
the issue of unfair labor practice – the subject matter of the foregoing Notice
of Strike and the Strike Vote – for voluntary arbitration with a view to
prevent the strike.
On
In the morning of
On
On
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, respondents are hereby declared to have staged an illegal
strike, and the employment of union officers and all individual respondents are
deemed validly terminated in accordance with law.
Finally,
all individual respondents are hereby directed to immediately remove their
picket lines and all physical obstructions that impede ingress and egress to
petitioner’s premises.
SO
ORDERED.[5]
The principal question before the Labor Arbiter was
whether the private respondents staged an illegal strike. Ruling in the affirmative, the Labor Arbiter
held that the Notice of Strike dated December 3, 1998 as well as the Strike
Vote of December 11, 1998 referred to a prior dispute submitted for voluntary
arbitration and, hence, they cannot apply to the strike staged about six months
later, which commenced on June 24, 1999 and ended on June 26, 1999; that, for
these reasons, the Union failed to comply with the mandatory requisites for a
lawful strike; that the issuance of memos by the petitioner to instill
discipline on erring employees is a lawful exercise of management prerogative
and do not amount to acts of unfair labor practice; that, instead of resorting
to a strike, private respondents should have availed of the proper legal
remedies such as the filing of complaints for illegal suspension or illegal
dismissal with the NLRC; that, the root causes of the controversy are the
petition for certification election and petition for cancellation of union
registration which were then pending before the Department of Labor as well as
the issue on unfair labor practice then pending before the voluntary
arbitrator, and, hence, the parties should have awaited the resolution of the
cases in the proper fora; and that even if private respondents complied with
all the requisites of a valid strike, the strike is still illegal due to the
commission of prohibited acts, including the obstruction of free ingress and
egress of the premises, intimidation, and threat inflicted upon non-striking
employees.
Private respondents appealed to the NLRC which, on
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby
granted. Accordingly, the Decision dated
All striking workers are hereby
ordered to return to work immediately and Sukhothai Restaurant to accept them
back to their former or equivalent positions.
If the same is no longer possible, Sukhothai Restaurant is ordered to
pay them separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of
service reckoned from their initial date of employment up to the present.
SO ORDERED.[6]
In overruling the Labor Arbiter, the
NLRC held that the petitioner is guilty of union busting; that the petitioner
violated the Submission Agreement dated December 10, 1998 in that no
termination shall be effected during the voluntary arbitration proceedings and,
hence, the strike was justified; that the Notice of Strike and Strike Vote
dated December 3, 1998 and December 11, 1998, respectively, are applicable to
the strike of June 24, 25, and 26, 1999 since the same issues of unfair labor
practice were involved and that unfair labor practices are continuing offenses;
that even if the foregoing Notice of Strike and Strike Vote were not
applicable, the Union may take action immediately since the petitioner is
guilty of union busting; and that the re-filing of a Notice of Strike on June
25, 1999 cured the defect of non-compliance with the mandatory
requirements.
After the NLRC denied the Motion for Reconsideration,
the petitioner appealed to the CA and raised the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE STRIKE STAGED BY THE
PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS IS LEGAL; and
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WHO
PARTICIPATED IN THE STRIKE AND COMMITTED ILLEGAL ACTS WERE PROPERLY AND VALIDLY
DECLARED TO HAVE LOST THEIR EMPLOYMENT STATUS.[7]
As stated above, the CA denied the
petition and affirmed the NLRC.
Petitioner is now before this Court, raising the following grounds:
I. THE COURT
OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED THE ISSUES IN THE INSTANT CASE IN A MANNER
CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE BY RULING THAT THE WILDCAT STRIKE
OF JUNE 24, 1999 IS VALID AND LEGAL DESPITE CLEAR AND INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE
THAT:
A. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH
THE REQUISITES FOR A VALID STRIKE AS PRESCRIBED BY THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF
THE LABOR CODE;
B.
THERE WERE NO STRIKEABLE ISSUES; AND
C.
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS COMMITTED ILLEGAL AND PROHIBITED
ACTS DURING THE STRIKE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED BY
FAILING TO ADDRESS THE OTHER ISSUES RAISED BY THE PETITIONER IN ITS PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI WHICH FAILURE AMOUNTED TO A DENIAL OF ITS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
OF LAW.[8]
The petition is meritorious.
The questions before this Court are whether the strike
staged by the private respondents is illegal; and whether private respondents
are deemed to have lost their employment status by participating in the
commission of illegal acts during the strike.
Respondents insist that the filing of the Notice of
Strike on December 3, 1998, the Strike Vote of December 11, 1998, the
submission of the results of the vote to the NCMB on December 21, 1998, and
their observation of the 15-day cooling-off period in case of unfair labor
practice as well as the seven-day reporting period of the results of the strike
vote, all satisfy the mandatory requirements under Article 263[9]
of the Labor Code and are applicable to the June 1999 strike. In support of this theory, respondents invoke
Article 263(f) in that the decision to strike is valid for the duration of the
dispute based on substantially the same grounds considered when the strike vote
was taken, thus, there is no need to repeat the process. Furthermore, according to the respondents,
even assuming for the sake of argument that the Notice of Strike and Strike
Vote in December 1998 cannot be made to apply to the concerted actions in June
1999, these requirements may nonetheless be dispensed with since the petitioner
is guilty of union busting and, hence, the
The undisputed fact, however, is that at
the time the strike was staged in June 1999, voluntary arbitration between the
parties was ongoing by virtue of the
Article
264 of the Labor Code provides:
Art. 264. Prohibited activities. –
x x x x
No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption
of jurisdiction by the President or the Secretary or after certification or
submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or
during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.
x x x x (emphasis
supplied)
This
Court has held that strikes staged in violation of agreements providing for
arbitration are illegal, since these agreements must be strictly adhered to and
respected if their ends are to be achieved.[10] The rationale of the prohibition under Article
264 is that once jurisdiction over the labor dispute has been properly acquired
by competent authority, that jurisdiction should not be interfered with by the
application of the coercive processes of a strike.[11] Indeed it is among the chief policies of the
State to promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective bargaining and
negotiations, including voluntary arbitration, mediation, and conciliation, as
modes of settling labor, or industrial disputes.[12] In Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor,[13] Chief Justice Fernando declared that the
principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace
cannot be secured through compulsion by law.
Relations between private employers and their employees rest on an
essentially voluntary basis, subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws
and other labor and welfare legislation.[14]
The
alleged dismissals of Lucente and respondent Lanorias, both union members,
which allegedly triggered the wildcat strike, are not sufficient grounds to
justify the radical recourse on the part of the private respondents. The questions that surround their dismissal,
as private respondents so affirm, are connected to the alleged breach of the
“guarantee” by the petitioner not to dismiss its employees during the pendency
of the arbitration case, the very questions which they also link to the other
incidents of unfair labor practices allegedly committed by the petitioner—these
matters should have been raised and resolved in the voluntary arbitration
proceedings that were commenced precisely to address them. On the other hand, if private respondents
believed that the disciplinary measures had nothing to do with the issues under
arbitration, then they should have availed of the appropriate remedies under
the Labor Code, such as the institution of cases of illegal dismissal[15]
or, by agreement of the parties, the submission of the cases to the grievance
machinery of the CBA, if one is available, so that they may be subjected to
separate voluntary arbitration proceedings,[16]
or simply seek to terminate the pending voluntary arbitration case and complete
the mandatory procedure for a lawful strike.
Private respondents should have availed themselves of any of these
alternative remedies instead of resorting to a drastic and unlawful measure,
specifically, the holding a wildcat strike.[17] And because of the fact that the
For failing to exhaust all steps in the
arbitration proceedings by virtue of the Submission Agreement, in view of the
proscription under Article 264 of the Labor Code, and the prevailing state
policy as well as its underlying rationale, this Court declares that the strike
staged by the private respondents is illegal.[19]
With respect to respondents’ averment
that assuming arguendo that the Notice of
Strike and Strike Vote in December 1998 cannot be made
to apply to the strike in June 1999, the requirements for a valid
strike may nonetheless
be dispensed
with in case of
union busting,[20]
the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the question at length, especially in
view of the foregoing declaration that the strike is illegal, as well as the
considerations of established doctrine: the language of the law leaves no room
for doubt that the cooling-off period and the seven-day strike ban after the
strike-vote report were intended to be mandatory,[21]
and in case of union busting where the existence of the union is threatened, it
is only the 15-day cooling-off period that may be dispensed with.
Article
263(f) in part states: “In every case, the union or the employer shall furnish
the Department the results of the voting at least seven days before the
intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period herein
provided.” This provision should be read
with Section 3, Rule XXII, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code,
then applicable at the time of the dispute, the relevant provisions of which
state:
However, in case of unfair
labor practice involving the dismissal from employment of any union officer
duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-laws which may
constitute union-busting where the existence of the union is threatened, the
fifteen-day cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may take action
immediately after the strike vote is conducted and the results thereof
submitted to the appropriate regional branch of the Board. (emphasis
supplied)
The
NCMB Primer on Strike, Picketing, and Lockout (January 31, 1992) provide the
same wording. The foregoing provision of
the implementing rules should also be compared to the provisions of the Labor
Code under Article 263(c):
(c) x x x However, in case
of dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with
the union constitution and by-laws, which may constitute union busting where
the existence of the union is threatened, the 15-day cooling-off period shall
not apply and the union may take action immediately.
The implementing rules clarify Article 263(c) in that the
union may strike “immediately” provided that the strike vote is conducted, the
results thereof submitted “in every case” at least seven days before the
intended strike or lockout. In sum, in
case of alleged union busting, the three remaining requirements – notice,
strike vote, and seven-day report period – cannot be dispensed with.[22]
What is more, the strike had been
attended by the widespread commission of prohibited acts. Well-settled is the rule that even if the
strike were to be declared valid because its objective or purpose is lawful,
the strike may still be declared invalid where the means employed are illegal.[23] Among such limits are the prohibited
activities under Article 264 of the Labor Code, particularly paragraph (e),
which states that no person engaged in picketing shall:
a) commit
any act of violence, coercion, or intimidation or
b) obstruct the free ingress to or egress from
the employer's premises for lawful
purposes, or
c) obstruct
public thoroughfares.
The following acts have been held to be prohibited
activities: where the strikers shouted slanderous and scurrilous words against
the owners of the vessels;[24]
where the strikers used unnecessary and obscene language[25]
or epithets to prevent other laborers to go to work,[26]
and circulated libelous statements against the employer which show actual
malice;[27]
where the protestors used abusive and threatening language towards the patrons
of a place of business or against co-employees, going beyond the mere attempt
to persuade customers to withdraw their patronage;[28]
where the strikers formed a human cordon and blocked all the ways and
approaches to the launches and vessels of the vicinity of the workplace[29]
and perpetrated acts of violence and coercion to prevent work from being
performed;[30]
and where the strikers shook their fists and threatened non-striking employees
with bodily harm if they persisted to proceed to the workplace.[31] Permissible activities of the
picketing workers do
not include obstruction of access of
customers.[32]
The
evidence in the record clearly and extensively shows that the individual
respondents engaged in illegal acts during the strike, such as the intimidation
and harassment of a considerable number of customers to turn them away and
discourage them from patronizing the business of the petitioner;[33]
waving their arms and shouting at the passersby, “Huwag kayong pumasok sa
Sukhothai!”[34] and “Nilagyan
na namin ng lason ang pagkain d’yan!”[35]
as well as numerous other statements made to discredit the reputation of
the establishment;[36]
preventing the entry of customers;[37]
angry and unruly behavior calculated to cause commotion[38]
which affected neighboring establishments within the mall;[39]
openly cursing and shouting at the president in front of customers[40]
and using loud and abusive language, such as “Putang ina niyong lahat!”,
toward the rest of the management[41]
as well as their co-workers who refused to go on strike;[42]
physically preventing non-strikers from entering the premises,[43]
as well as deliberately blocking their movements inside the restaurant,[44]
at times by sharply bumping into them[45]
or through indecent physical contact;[46]
openly threatening non-strikers with bodily harm, such as “Pag hindi sila
pumayag, upakan mo!”;[47]
and shouting at the security guard “Granada!” which caused panic among
the customers and prompted security to report a possible death threat to
management and the security agency.[48]
In the determination of the
liabilities of the individual respondents, the applicable provision is Article
264(a) of the Labor Code:
Art. 264. Prohibited
Activities – (a) x x x
x x x x
x x x x Any union officer who knowingly participates
in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates
in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost
his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a
lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his
employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such
lawful strike.
x x
x x
In Samahang Manggagawa sa Sulpicio
Lines, Inc.-NAFLU v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc.[49]
this Court explained that the effects of such illegal strikes, outlined in
Article 264, make a distinction between workers and union officers who
participate therein: an ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere
participation in an illegal strike.
There must be proof that he or she committed illegal acts during a
strike. A union officer, on the other
hand, may be terminated from work when he knowingly participates in an illegal
strike, and like other workers, when he commits an illegal act during a strike.[50] In all cases, the striker must be
identified. But proof beyond reasonable
doubt is not required. Substantial
evidence available under the attendant circumstances, which may justify the
imposition of the penalty of dismissal, may suffice.[51] Liability for prohibited acts is to be
determined on an individual basis:
|
Private Respondent |
Rank in
Respondent |
Illegal Acts |
|
Emmanuel Cayno |
President |
Knowingly participating in an illegal
strike; shouting at the security guard “Granada!”
which caused panic among the customers;[52]
Intimidating, harassing, preventing, and discouraging customers from entering
the restaurant;[53]
publicly denouncing the reputation of the establishment;[54]
openly threatening non-strikers with bodily harm;[55]
|
|
Billy Bacus |
Vice President |
Knowingly participating in an illegal
strike; Intimidating, harassing, preventing, and discouraging customers from
entering the restaurant;[56]
use of abusive language towards management or non-strikers;[57]
deliberately blocking the movements of management or non-strikers inside the
restaurant;[58] |
|
Analiza Cablay |
Secretary |
Knowingly participating in an illegal
strike; Intimidating, harassing, preventing, and discouraging customers from
entering the restaurant;[59] |
|
Jose Neil Arcilla |
Treasurer |
Knowingly participating in an illegal
strike; Intimidating, harassing, preventing, and discouraging customers from
entering the restaurant;[60]
publicly denouncing the reputation of the establishment;[61]
coercing non-strikers to strike;[62]
Cursing and use of abusive language towards management, non-strikers, or
customers;[63]
|
|
Roel Esancha |
Auditor |
Knowingly participating in an illegal
strike; intimidating, harassing, preventing, and discouraging customers from
entering the restaurant;[64] |
|
Claudio Panaligan |
Board Member |
Knowingly participating in an illegal
strike; use of abusive language towards management, non-strikers, or
customers;[65]
intimidating, harassing, preventing, and discouraging customers from entering
the restaurant;[66]
deliberately blocking the movements of management or non-strikers inside the
restaurant;[67]
|
|
Rey Arsenal |
Member |
Intimidating, harassing, preventing,
and discouraging customers from entering the restaurant;[68] |
|
Alex Martinez |
Member |
Intimidating, harassing, preventing,
and discouraging customers from entering the restaurant;[69] |
|
Hermie Raz |
Member |
Cursing and use of abusive language
towards management, non-strikers, or
customers;[70]
deliberately blocking the movements of management or non-strikers inside the
restaurant;[71]
intimidating, harassing, preventing, and discouraging customers from entering
the restaurant;[72] |
|
Jose Lanorias |
Member |
Intimidating, harassing, preventing,
and discouraging customers from entering the restaurant;[73] |
|
Lito Arce |
Member |
|
|
Cesar Sangreo |
Member |
|
|
Rolando Fabregas |
Member |
|
|
Jimmy Balan |
Member |
Id.;[77] deliberately
blocking movements of non-strikers inside the restaurant by sharply bumping
into them[78]
or through indecent physical contact; [79] cursing and use of abusive language towards
management, non-strikers, or
customers;[80] |
|
Joven Lualhati |
Member |
Intimidating, harassing, preventing,
and discouraging customers from entering the restaurant;[81] |
|
Antonio Enebrad |
Member |
|
|
Edgar Eugenio |
Member |
|
|
Albert Agbuya |
Member |
Intimidating, harassing, preventing, and discouraging customers from
entering the restaurant;[85] |
|
Arnel Salvador |
Member |
|
|
Ricky Del Prado |
Member |
|
|
Bernie Del Mundo |
Member |
|
|
Roberto Eco |
Member |
|
|
Joven Talidong |
Member |
|
|
Leny Lucente |
Member |
|
|
Rigoberto Tubaon |
Member |
Intimidating, harassing, preventing, and discouraging customers from
entering the restaurant;[93]
cursing and use of abusive language towards management, non-strikers, or customers;[94] |
|
Merly Naz |
Member |
Intimidating, harassing, preventing,
and discouraging customers from entering the restaurant;[95]
cursing and use of abusive language towards management, non-strikers, or customers;[96] |
|
Lino Salubre |
Member |
Preventing and discouraging customers from entering the restaurant;[97] |
|
Rolando Pugong |
Member |
Preventing and discouraging customers from entering the restaurant;[98] |
|
John Bathan |
Member |
Intimidating, harassing, preventing, and discouraging customers from
entering the restaurant;[99] |
Thus, the Labor Arbiter is correct in
ruling that the employment of all individual private respondents are deemed
validly terminated.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals together with the Decision
dated November 29, 2000 of the National Labor Relations Commission are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Decision of
the Labor Arbiter dated
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO ROMEO J. CALLEJO,
SR.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. De Los Santos, with Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto (now retired) and Bernardo P. Abesamis (now retired), concurring.
[2]
[3] The
name of the petitioner as a party-in-interest should read “Rosemich, Inc.”
which is the legal entity that owns and manages the Sukhothai restaurants at
the SM Megamall Bldg. A and at the
[4]
At the time of the suit, the
Union membership included the employees of both the SM Mega Mall (Mandaluyong)
and Glorietta III (
[5] Rollo, pp. 87-88.
[6] Id.at 100-101.
[7] CA rollo, p. 16.
[8] Rollo, p. 30.
[9] Labor Code, Art. 263. Strikes, picketing and lockouts. - (a) x x x x
x x x x
(c) In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or recognized bargaining agent may file a notice of strike or the employer may file a notice of lockout with the Department at least thirty (30) days before the intended date thereof. In cases of unfair labor practice, the period of notice shall be fifteen (15) days and in the absence of a duly certified or recognized bargaining agent, the notice of strike may be filed by any legitimate labor organization in behalf of its members. However, in case of dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-laws, which may constitute union busting where the existence of the union is threatened, the 15-day cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may take action immediately.
x x x x
(f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for that purpose. A decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a majority of the board of directors of the corporation or association or of the partners in a partnership, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose. The decision shall be valid for the duration of the dispute based on substantially the same grounds considered when the strike or lockout vote was taken. The Department may at its own initiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of the secret balloting. In every case, the union or the employer shall furnish the Department the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period herein provided. (emphasis supplied)
[10]
San Miguel Corp. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 451 Phil. 514, 527 (2003); Insurefco Paper Pulp
& Project Workers’
[11]
Telefunken Semiconductors
Employees
[12]
The
Labor Code of the
[13] 209 Phil. 1 (1983).
[14] Id.at
15. See Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 85279, July 28, 1989, 175 SCRA 686, 697 (reiterating the
foregoing labor-relations policy). A dispute pending in voluntary arbitration
(or compulsory arbitration) cannot be the subject of a strike or lockout notice.
2
[15]
See The Labor Code of the
Philippines, P.D. No. 442, as amended, Art. 217(a)(2) (1974). See generally National
[16] Labor
Code, Articles 260 and 262 provide:
Article
260. Grievance Machinery and Voluntary Arbitration. – The parties to a
Collective Bargaining Agreement shall include therein provisions that will
ensure the mutual observance of its terms and conditions. They shall establish
a machinery for the adjustment and resolution of grievances arising from the
interpretation or implementation of their Collective Bargaining Agreement and
those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies.
x
x x x
For
this purpose, parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement shall name and
designate in advance a Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators,
or include in the agreement a procedure for the selection of such Voluntary
Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, preferably from the listing of
qualified Voluntary Arbitrators duly accredited by the Board. In case the
parties fail to select a Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators, the Board shall designate the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators, as may be necessary, pursuant to the selection procedure
agreed upon in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, which shall act with the
same force and effect as if the Arbitrator or panel of Arbitrators has been
selected by the parties as described above.
Article 262. Jurisdiction over other labor disputes. – The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, upon agreement of the parties, shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks.
See National
[17]
National
[18]
[19] San Miguel Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 10, at 527; San Miguel Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 363 Phil. 377, 384 (1999).
[20] The Labor Code, Article 263(c),
provides in part: “x x x However, in case of dismissal from employment of union
officers duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-laws,
which may constitute union busting where the existence of the union is
threatened, the 15-day cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may
take action immediately.”
[21] Samahang Manggagawa sa Sulpicio Lines,
Inc.-NAFLU v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc.,
G.R. No. 140992, March 25, 2004, 426 SCRA 319, 325; Gold City Integrated
Port Service, Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission , 315
Phil. 698, 709 (1995); Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestlé Philippines,
Inc., G.R. Nos. 88710-13, December 19, 1990, 192 SCRA 396, 411-412; National
Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW) v. Ovejera, 199 Phil. 537, 550 (1982). The claim of good faith is not a valid excuse
to dispense with the procedural steps for a lawful strike. Grand Boulevard Hotel, Inc. v. Genuine
Labor Organization of Workers in Hotel, Restaurant and Allied Industries
(GLOWHRAIN), 454 Phil. 463, 490 (2003).
[22]
See 2
[23]
Association of Independent
Unions in the
[24]
United Seamen’s Union of the
Philippines v. Davao Shipowners Association, G.R. Nos. L-18778 &
L-18779,
[25]
Cromwell Commercial Employees
and Laborers
[26] Liberal Labor Union v. Philippine Can Co., 91 Phil. 72, 78 (1952).
[27] Linn v. United Plan Guard Workers, 15 L.Ed 2d 582.
[28] 31 Am. Jur. § 245, p. 954; 116 A.L.R. 477, 505; 32 A.L.R. 756; 27 A.L.R. 375; cited in 2 C.A. Azucena, The Labor Code With Comments and Cases p.500 (1999).
[29]
Association of Independent
Unions in the
[30]
[31] Id.;
The following likewise have been found to be illegal acts: where strikers
hijacked the employer’s bus and barricaded the terminal by means of five buses
which had also been hijacked; the hijacking of 26 more buses which resulted in
injuries to some employees and panic to the commuters; the destruction of
company property; and the use of molotov bombs thrown into the work compound, First
City Interlink Transportation Co., Inc. v. Sec. Confesor, supra note 18, at
645; where non-strikers were mauled and
suffered physical injuries inflicted by the strikers, United Seamen’s Union
of the Philippines v. Davao Shipowners Association, supra note 24, at 1237;
Shell Oil Workers Union v. Shell Company
of the Philippines, Ltd., 148-A Phil. 229, 247; the breaking of the truck
side and windows, and throwing of empty bottles at non-strikers, Philippine
Marine Officers’ Guild v. Compania Maritima, 131 Phil. 218, 232 (1968);
where the strikers resorted to terrorism to prevent non-strikers from working, Liberal
Labor Union v. Philippine Can Co.,supra note 26, at 78; where acts of
sabotage were committed against property, National Labor Union, Inc. v. Court
of Industrial Relations, 70 Phil. 300; and where the strikers committed
acts of violence by hurling stones which smashed glass windows of the building
of the company and headlights of the car, Cromwell Commercial Employees and
Laborers Union (PTUC) v. Court of Industrial Relations, supra note 25, at
132. Moreover, authorities are of the view that where the picketing is so
conducted as to amount to a nuisance, the picketing is unlawful. The following have been deemed acts of
nuisance: where the obstruction to the free use of property so as substantially
to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property; where the
picketing constitutes an unlawful obstruction to the free passage or use, in
the customary manner, of a street, 31 Am.
Jur. § 248, p. 955, cited in
2 C.A. Azucena, The Labor Code With
Comments and Cases p. 499 (1999); where there is an obstruction of
access of customers, since pickets may not aggressively interfere with the
right of peaceful ingress and egress to and from the employer’s shop; where the
entrance to the place of business is obstructed by protesters parading around
in a circle or lying on the sidewalk, 31 Am.
Jur. § 249, p. 955, cited in 2 C.A. Azucena, The Labor Code With Comments and Cases p. 499
(1999); where vandalism and acts of a less terroristic nature are carried out
to cause physical discomfort to the employer’s customers, 48-A Am. Jur. 2d 2059, pp. 427-28, cited in 2 C.A. Azucena, The Labor Code With Comments and Cases p. 499
(1999); and where words or acts are calculated and intended to cause an ordinary
person to fear an injury to his person, business, or property; where there is
display of force without actual use thereof may be intimidation, id. Authorities are also of the view that the
following means used to carry on a picketing or strike were illegal: where the
strikers conspired to injure the business by inducing willing patrons and
would-be patrons to withdraw or withhold patronage by assembling at or near the
entrance of the restaurant during all business hours and continuously
announcing in a loud voice, audible for a great distance, that the restaurant
was unfair to the labor union; by disparaging the restaurant, charging that the
prices were higher and the food worse than in any other restaurant; and by
attacking the character of those who did patronize, saying that their mental
caliber and moral fiber fell below the average. Truax v. Corrigan, 257
U.S. 312 (1921), cited in 2
[32] C.A. Azucena, Everyone’s Labor Code 268 (2001) (interpreting Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code).
[33]
Affidavit of Ernest A. Briza
dated
[34] Affidavit of Ernest A. Briza, supra; Affidavit of Ernesto J. Garcia, supra; Affidavit of Ruben T. Tabonares, Jr., supra; Affidavit of Julius M. Dela Cruz, supra.
[35] Affidavit of Rico G. Calixijan, supra.
[36] Affidavit of Rianna de Belen, supra.
[37]
Affidavit of Ma. Teresa Dela Cruz
dated
[38] Affidavit of Ruben T. Tabonares, Jr., supra; Affidavit of Leolito S. Adim, supra; Affidavit of Rianna de Belen, supra.
[39] Affidavit of Rianna de Belen, supra.
[40] Affidavit of Ma. Teresa Dela Cruz, supra; Affidavit of Ernesto J. Garcia, supra.
[41] Affidavit of Rosario V. Garcia dated July 15, 1999; rollo, p. 249; Affidavit of Ruben T. Tabonares, Jr., supra; Affidavit of Teresa Ileto-Severino dated September 20, 1999, rollo, p. 259; Affidavit of Julius M. Dela Cruz, supra.
[42] Affidavit of Joanna Lisa A. Morata dated July 15, 1999, rollo, p. 245; Affidavit of Ruben T. Tabonares, Jr., supra; Affidavit of Julius M. Dela Cruz, supra; Affidavit of Rianna de Belen, supra.
[43] Affidavit of Rosario V. Garcia, supra.
[44] Affidavit of Joanna Lisa A. Morata, supra; Affidavit of Julius M. Dela Cruz, supra.
[45]
Affidavit of Lucille Entong dated
[46] Affidavit of Lucille Entong, supra; Affidavit of Julius M. Dela Cruz, supra.
[47]
Affidavit of Dante Versola dated
[48]
Affidavit of Erwin B. Gonzaga
dated
[49]
Supra note 21; Telefunken Semiconductors Employees
Union-FFW v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 347 Phil. 447, 454-455
(1997); Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,
supra note 21, at 709-710.
[50] Samahang Manggagawa sa Sulpicio Lines, Inc.-NAFLU v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., supra note 21, at 328; Union officers are duty bound to guide their members to respect the law. If instead of doing so, the officers urge the members to violate the law and defy the duly constituted authorities; their dismissal from the service is a just penalty or sanction for their unlawful acts. The officers' responsibility is greater than that of the members. Association of Independent Unions in the Philippines (AIUP) v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 23, at 708; Continental Cement Labor Union v. Continental Cement Corporation, G.R. No. 51544, August 30, 1990, 189 SCRA 134, 141; First City Interlink Transportation Co., Inc. v. Sec. Confesor, supra note 18, at 644; Lapanday Workers Union v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 95494-97, September 7, 1995, 248 SCRA 95, 106.
[51]
Association of Independent
Unions in the
[52] Affidavit of Erwin B. Gonzaga, supra.
[53] Affidavit of Ernest A. Briza, supra; Affidavit of Ernesto J. Garcia, supra; Affidavit of Teresa Ileto-Severino, supra.
[54] Affidavit of Rico G. Calixijan, supra.
[55]
[56] Affidavit of Teresa Ileto-Severino, supra.
[57] Affidavit of Ma. Teresa Dela Cruz, supra.
[58] Affidavit of Joanna Lisa A. Morata, supra; Affidavit of Rosario V. Garcia, supra.
[59] Affidavit of Ernest A. Briza, supra; Affidavit of Ernesto J. Garcia, supra; Affidavit of Marissa C. Ileto dated July 15, 1999, rollo, pp. 243-244; Affidavit of Teresa Ileto-Severino, supra.
[60] Affidavit of Ernest A. Briza, supra; Affidavit of Ernesto J. Garcia, supra; Affidavit of Teresa Ileto-Severino, supra.
[61] Affidavit of Rico G. Calixijan, supra.
[62] Affidavit
of Dante Versola, supra.
[63]
[64] Affidavit of Teresa Ileto-Severino, supra.
[65] Affidavit of Joanna Lisa A. Morata, supra; Affidavit of Teresa Ileto-Severino, supra.
[66] Affidavit of Teresa Ileto-Severino, supra.
[67] Affidavit of Joanna Lisa A. Morata, supra.
[68] Affidavit of Ernest A. Briza, supra; Affidavit of Ernesto J. Garcia, supra; Affidavit of Teresa Ileto-Severino, supra.
[69] Affidavit of Teresa Ileto-Severino, supra.
[70] Affidavit of Ma. Teresa Dela Cruz, supra; Affidavit of Ernesto J. Garcia, supra; Affidavit of Joanna Lisa A. Morata, supra; Affidavit of Rosario V. Garcia, supra; Affidavit of Lucille Entong, supra; Affidavit of Teresa Ileto-Severino, supra; Affidavit of Rianna de Belen, supra.
[71] Affidavit of Joanna Lisa A. Morata, supra.
[72] Affidavit of Teresa Ileto-Severino, supra.
[73]
[74]
[75] Affidavit of Ernest A. Briza, supra; Affidavit of Ernesto J. Garcia, supra; Affidavit of Teresa Ileto-Severino, supra.
[76] Affidavit of Teresa Ileto-Severino, supra.
[77] Affidavit of Ernesto J. Garcia, supra; Affidavit of Joanna Lisa A. Morata, supra; Affidavit of Teresa Ileto-Severino, supra.
[78] Affidavit of Lucille Entong, supra; Affidavit of Julius M. Dela Cruz, supra.
[79] Affidavit of Lucille Entong, supra; Affidavit of Julius M. Dela Cruz, supra.
[80] Affidavit of Rianna de Belen, supra.
[81] Affidavit of Teresa Ileto-Severino, supra.
[82]
[83] Affidavit of Ernesto J. Garcia, supra; Affidavit of Teresa Ileto-Severino, supra.
[84] Affidavit of Lucille Entong, supra; Affidavit of Teresa Ileto-Severino, supra; Affidavit of Rianna de Belen, supra.
[85] Affidavit of Ernesto J. Garcia, supra; Affidavit of Joanna Lisa A. Morata, supra; Affidavit of Teresa Ileto-Severino, supra.
[86] Affidavit of Teresa Ileto-Severino, supra; Affidavit of Ernesto J. Garcia, supra.
[87] Affidavit of Teresa Ileto-Severino, supra.
[88]
[89] Affidavit of Ernesto J. Garcia, supra; Affidavit of Teresa Ileto-Severino, supra.
[90] Affidavit of Teresa Ileto-Severino, supra; Affidavit of Ernest A. Briza, supra; Affidavit of Ernesto J. Garcia, supra.
[91] Affidavit of Ernesto J. Garcia, supra; Affidavit of Teresa Ileto-Severino, supra.
[92] Affidavit of Dante Versola, supra.
[93] Affidavit of Ernesto J. Garcia, supra; Affidavit of Teresa Ileto-Severino, supra.
[94] Affidavit of Lucille Entong, supra.
[95] Affidavit of Ernest A. Briza, supra.
Affidavit of Marissa C. Ileto, supra; Affidavit of Teresa Ileto-Severino, supra.
[96] Affidavit of Lucille Entong, supra.
[97] Affidavit of Ernesto J. Garcia, supra.
[98]
[99] Affidavit of Teresa Ileto-Severino, supra.